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Abstract
This working paper explores the processes in which accession to different regional blocs has affected the 
ways the state interacts with societal actors, along with the interest representation and mediation mod-
els in both member and accession countries. Focusing on Turkey and Mexico, two upper-middle-income 
countries situated on the fringes of major powers and integrated into the regional blocs led by those, the 
paper examines the differential impact of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) on the organization and mediation of business interests; the ways in which these in-
terests are incorporated into policy-making; and the processes of social dialogue. Taking into consideration 
the fundamental differences between these two regionalisms, it looks into both direct and indirect mecha-
nisms with respect to the influence of regional-level actors on domestic actors and institutions. Maintaining 
that the impact of regional blocs cannot be easily isolated from that of international, transnational actors 
and processes, the paper scrutinizes the respective roles of international actors and transnational net-
works which, at times, have become more influential than the regional blocs in bringing about major in-
stitutional changes at the domestic level. Thus, it sheds light on processes of comparative regionalization 
and their varying influences on distinct polities, which is usually combined and even furthered or, rather, 
obstructed by the influences of transnational, international and global forces, along with domestic actors 
and institutions. 
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1. Introduction
Since the 1980s, most middle-income countries have undertaken drastic transitions from state-led de-
velopment to market-oriented models, as they increasingly became integrated into global markets and 
regional blocs. State-society relations have transformed throughout these transitions in which market 
players and their preferences have been subject to major changes. The processes of regionalization, glo-
balization and transnationalization have played substantial - and at times intertwined - roles in triggering 
such changes regarding the ways in which societal actors are organized and interact with the respective 
states. Following decades of protectionism, domestic businesses in these countries have been particularly 
affected by these processes which have increasingly exposed them to fierce international competition. 
Regional blocs have played different roles in facilitating, furthering or aggravating these outcomes.
This working paper explores the processes in which accession to different regional blocs has affected the 
ways the state interacts with societal actors, along with the interest representation and mediation models 
in member and accession countries. Focusing on Turkey and Mexico, two upper-middle-income countries 
situated on the fringes of major powers and integrated into the regional blocs led by those, the paper ex-
amines the differential impact of the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) on the organization and mediation of business interests; the ways in which these interests are 
incorporated into policy-making; and processes of social dialogue. Taking into consideration the funda-
mental differences between these two regionalisms, particularly regarding the level of institutionalization, 
the paper tackles direct and indirect mechanisms with respect to the influence of regional-level actors on 
domestic actors and institutions. Drawing from the extant literature in comparative regionalism, it puts 
forward that regionalisms vary considerably in both what they intend to transform and what they can ac-
tually transform or what they end up transforming. The paper provides ample evidence for such variation. 
Given the entwined processes of regionalization and transnationalization, the paper maintains that the 
impact of regional blocs cannot be easily isolated from that of international, transnational actors and 
processes along with the interaction between those (Schmidt 2002). Accordingly, it scrutinizes the roles of 
international actors and transnational networks which, at times, have become more influential than the 
regional blocs in bringing about major institutional changes in some issue areas at the domestic level. It 
sheds light on processes of comparative regionalization and their varying influences on distinct polities, 
which is usually combined and even furthered or, rather, obstructed by the influences of transnational, 
international and global forces, along with domestic actors and institutions. Pointing out the widespread 
existence of decoupling across regionalization between de jure constellations and de facto operation of 
the changes brought about by regionalization, the paper argues that higher levels of de jure institution-
alization are no panacea for thwarting decoupling and puts forward that the likelihood of decoupling 
increases further when the credibility of full accession to regional blocs diminishes (Börzel/Soyaltın 2012; 
Müftüler-Baç 2005).
The paper asserts that in both Turkey and Mexico, a process of partial convergence (with the practices 
of the other member states of the respective regional blocs) has prevailed regarding the ways in which 
businesses are organized and interact with the respective states, despite the fact that some of the central 
institutional changes promoted by the blocs have failed to be implemented effectively. Although the EU 
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strengthened some of the corporatist dynamics in Turkey, especially corporatist organizations, the NAFTA 
fostered the dismantling of Mexican corporatism and promoted pluralism.1 Likewise, all-encompassing 
organizations have been empowered in Turkey, while considerably weakened in Mexico. Despite such 
seemingly diverging outcomes, interest mediation in both cases has increasingly excluded labor, adopting 
a bilateral form between the state and business. 
In the case of Turkey’s protracted-cum-stalled accession to the EU and fading credibility of full-member-
ship attached to it, the paper underlines the increasingly limited nature of the EU’s transformative power 
particularly with regard to social dialogue between the state and societal actors. Examining the deficient 
process of Europeanization in this regard, it investigates how Europeanization has been curtailed by do-
mestic actors, politics and institutions particularly in day-to-day practice (Börzel/Pamuk 2012; Noutcheva/
Düzgit 2012; Özel 2013a). It shows that even the highest level de jure institutionalization does not guaran-
tee the effective operation of grafted new institutions based on the conditionalities or recommendations 
of regional blocs and/or international organizations. It further demonstrates ‘the transformative power’ of 
distinct international organizations and transnational networks in bringing about institutional changes in 
business’ interest mediation in Turkey, at times competing, at other times substituting the transformative 
power of Europe. 
In the case of Mexico’s accession to NAFTA, the accession process and membership to NAFTA helped 
extend changes in social dialogue and interest mediation, although such changes are not required by the 
NAFTA agreement or the membership conditions. Despite its generally limited degree of institutionaliza-
tion on many different levels, NAFTA has brought about new forms of political organization and behavior, 
particularly in Mexico, referred to as “Nafta-ization” (Aspinwall 2009). The very dynamics of Mexican state 
and non-state actors’ interaction with their counterparts in NAFTA affected the direction of these changes, 
whilst engendering the establishment of new institutions and organizations. The concurrence between 
the NAFTA accession and the ongoing domestic institutional changes in Mexico bolstered the extent of 
convergence, strengthened transnational networks, accelerating the dismantling of corporatism along 
with its entrenched institutions and the transition to the Anglo-Saxon form of pluralism in a changing 
organizational landscape. 
Thus, the incorporation into regional blocs, including both the actual accession and the process of acces-
sion, functioned as a major source or catalyst of change in some respects, while having failed to foster 
changes in some others. In some issue areas and cases, other sources of change than the integration into 
regional blocs worked more effectively for countries like Turkey and Mexico where other conditionalities 
and/or policy recommendations could override those of the regional blocs, particularly when they coin-
cided with the interests of domestic and transnational capital. Such a plurality of sources of change and 
the complexity of interactions between them epitomize the increasing understanding that regionalization 
is only one of the games in town, notwithstanding the significance of the changes that it brings about (Bör-
zel/Risse 2012; Özel 2013a). The cases presented in this paper exemplify the complementary processes of 
regionalization, globalization and transnationalization in generating domestic changes in two upper-mid-
dle-income countries. 
1 Throughout the paper, corporatist organizations refer to those which have semi-public legal status, considered as 
the official representatives of civil society based on compulsory membership of all respective interests, while plu-
ralist organizations refer to those based on voluntary membership. 
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1.1 Why Mexico and Turkey and Their Incorporation into Regional Blocs?
Turkey and Mexico as similar cases provide us with useful insights about remarkable market openings and 
their numerous impacts on state-society relations. Both are upper-middle-income countries with fairly 
developed industrial bases, which are placed in the fuzzy group of `emerging markets` and were recently 
lumped into the group of `MISTs` (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey) adjacent to the BRIC group 
(Brazil, Russia, India and China; O’Neill 2001). Both are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-op-
eration and Development (OECD), being constant outliers, and members of the G20, striving to raise their 
voice in international forums as well as in their own regional hinterlands. 
Both countries have gone through similar transitions from a statist development strategy, mostly based on 
an import substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy, to a market-oriented model and they were amongst 
the pioneers of the market reform process in upper-middle-income countries (Özel forthcoming). After 
having protected the domestic industry for about five decades (notwithstanding occasional attempts to 
open up), both cases developed considerable industrial bases accompanied by significant domestic busi-
ness interests. Similarly, the market transitions were initiated under the auspices of international financial 
institutions (IFIs) (accompanied by hefty loans) and consolidated under the scrutiny of different region-
al blocs. Besides bowing to the overall pressure of globalization to open up, both made simultaneous 
commitments to major regional trade blocs: NAFTA in the case of Mexico (1994) and the Customs Union 
Agreement in the case of Turkey (1995). 
Both Turkey and Mexico have been largely affected by regional integration processes. Undoubtedly, the 
Customs Union Agreement in the case of Turkey entailed a higher degree of commitment regarding insti-
tutional changes, as it was considered an essential step towards accession negotiations on full EU-mem-
bership, which required compliance with the acquis communautaire. Although the Turkish accession to 
the EU, formally launched in 2005, has become a rather protracted and stalled process, the impact of the 
EU has been substantial on some issue areas and actors, but limited on others (Noutcheva/Aydin-Düzgit 
2012; Börzel/Soyaltin 2012; Keyman/Öniş 2007; Müftüler-Baç 2005; Özel 2013a). Evidently, respective 
accessions to a free trade bloc and a supranational bloc like the EU entail different dynamics which are dif-
ficult to compare, and Turkey’s journey to accession has been on its way for five decades. Nevertheless, re-
garding social dialogue and interest mediation, both NAFTA and the EU have triggered changes in different 
directions, and changes influenced by the former are greater in certain respects, despite its limited nature 
compared to the EU. Although NAFTA is limited in terms of its scope and institutionalization, it has also 
given rise to significant institutional changes dubbed as “Nafta-ization” (Aspinwall 2009). These changes 
include shifts in institutional and organizational arrangements and capacities of civil society actors. In both 
countries, domestic institutions and interests have filtered and reshaped the processes through which the 
changes occurred and operated in practice (Özel 2012). The interplay between external sources of change 
and the adoption of changes by some domestic actors and existing institutions as well as the effective 
resistance by some others caused contestation of implanted institutions, often leading to conversion and 
drifting of institutions through the discrepancy between their de jure constellations and their de facto 
operation in both countries. 
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Regional integration processes facilitated export-led growth, accompanied by increasing dependency on 
the respective regional markets: Following the NAFTA process, about 80 per cent of the Mexican exports 
are oriented towards the U.S. market only, whereas the dependency of Turkish exports on the EU markets 
has recently dropped from 55-60 per cent in the late 1990s to 47 per cent (INEGI 2012; TSI 2013). Given 
the settling of export-oriented growth models and high levels of dependency in the respective regional 
markets, their business cycles have been highly synchronized with those in the U.S. and Europe respec-
tively (Altuğ/Bildirici 2011). 
In both countries, the domestic industry was historically nurtured by the state within the context of a 
state-led development strategy originally initiated in the 1930s, giving rise to a high level of capital con-
centration and the domination of large conglomerates with access to multi-sectoral investment and in-
ter-firm proprietary structures. The ISI regime prioritized big business in both countries under “implicit 
pacts,” providing businesses with a broad range of selective incentives and granting privileged access 
to state authorities as well as oligopolistic and monopolistic profits in large domestic markets (Barkey 
1990; Buğra 1994; Heredia 1996; Luna 1992; Özel 2003). More or less concurrent transformations in po-
litical and social institutions engendered new incentives for business actors, along with major challenges 
brought about by exposure to fierce international competition. In both countries, there has been increas-
ing diversification and transnationalization of businesses since the 1990s. A common vein in the context 
of these transformations has been the decreasing power of labor in both cases (more drastic of a change 
in Mexico compared to that in Turkey), exemplified by the exclusion of labor from - or the collapse of - var-
ious trilateral platforms of social dialogue, and prevalence of bilateral forms of bargaining between the 
state and business actors. 
Skeptics might suggest that despite all these common features, important institutional differences make 
the two trajectories divergent: presidentialism in Mexico vs. parliamentarism in Turkey; Mexico’s long-last-
ing one-party dominant regime vs. Turkey’s fragmented multi-party regime; and, finally, different interest 
mediation models, i.e., Mexico’s (in)famous corporatism vs. Turkey’s peculiar mix of corporatism and plu-
ralism. However, both cases have experienced changes regarding these institutions that make them more 
or less akin in this regard. First, while presidentialism in Mexico has been weakening, the Turkish parlia-
mentary system operates like a de facto presidentialism based on the enhanced power of the executive 
(Hernandez Rodriguez 2005; Özbudun 2012). Thus, in spite of the existence of different regime types, the 
power of the executive can be considered a common trait in these cases: The executive has historically 
had immense power in Mexico, though it has been decreasing in the last two decades (Bejar Algazi 2009; 
Alvarado 2009). Although Turkey has a parliamentary system, executive discretion has increasingly pre-
vailed since the 1982 Constitution. 
Second, the dominant-party regime led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) withered away in 
Mexico in the late 1990s, a process culminating in the National Action Party (PAN)’s coming to power 
in 2000. In Turkey, however, the party system has increasingly adapted a one-party-dominant character 
under the rule of the AKP, the incumbent which came to power in 2002. Although Turkey was never con-
sidered a typical corporatist country, some of the essential characteristics of corporatism have prevailed 
since the 1920s, including the compulsory membership in and state control over semi-public chambers. In 
both countries, business’ formal access to state actors has always been accompanied by a variety of infor-
mal channels, signified by clientelistic mechanisms (Heper 1991; Heredia 1998; Sayarı 2011; Özel 2003). 
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Diverging paths across the two cases appeared rather recently as the compulsory membership in cham-
bers, a key feature of corporatism, prevails in Turkey, but was abolished in Mexico in 1996. A striking differ-
ence between these trajectories is that the power of all-encompassing organizations (mainly corporatist/
semi-public, but also pluralist) declined in Mexico, in spite of their increasing role in Turkey by the begin-
ning of the 21st century. Transnational ties, regional and supranational influences have been influential in 
both cases, but interestingly, their role diverged regarding interest mediation: In Mexico, they contributed 
to the emergence of an Anglo-Saxon style of lobbying, whereas, in Turkey, they helped strengthen all-en-
compassing organizations along with helping empower semi-corporatism.
1.2 Regionalization, Globalization, Institutional Change and Decoupling 
In both Mexico and Turkey, domestic institutions and interests filtered and reshaped the processes in 
which changes occurred and operated in practice (Aspinwall 2009; Clarkson 2002; Özel 2012). The in-
terplay between external sources of change, the adoption of changes by domestic actors on the one 
hand and the existing institutions and their defense by other domestic actors on the other hand, caused 
substantial tension and contestation of the institutions implanted by direct and/or indirect pressures of 
multiple international, regional and supranational actors. Such contestation becomes more effective at 
the level of implementation, displayed by the discrepancy between de jure constellations of institutions 
and their de facto operation, i.e., institutional decoupling, a common occurrence in both countries (Özel 
forthcoming).
Extant literature on regionalism, particularly on Europeanization, widely suggests that domestic arrange-
ments may mitigate or impair institutional adaptation (Börzel 2002; Hix/Goetz 2000). A major challenge 
in the context of studying adaptation is to isolate the impact of regionalism from the effects of other 
sources. As Börzel and Risse (2012: 2) point out, “even in current candidate countries […] the EU is not the 
only game in town in driving domestic reforms.” Both Mexico and Turkey provide good examples for inter-
twined influences, since international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the OECD also played key roles in terms of exerting 
conditionalities, policy suggestions and facilitating transnational networks (Clarkson 2002; Özel 2013a).  
Inexorably, the EU has exerted a higher level of influence over the multifarious transformations Turkey has 
gone through given its status as an accession country, the very nature of the EU and the accession. This 
has entailed a process of Europeanization defined as institutional adaptation regarding institutions and 
practices at the national level, operationalized as the range of adaptation of what is requested or recom-
mended by the EU agencies at both de jure and de facto levels (Börzel 2002; Olsen 2002; Risse et al. 2001). 
This working paper examines adaptation through both formal rule transfer and effective implementation 
that involves changes in actors’ behaviour (Börzel/Risse 2012). It suggests that adaptation might become 
futile even in the presence of the highest level of formal institutionalization when hindering domestic 
institutions are not thwarted. The Turkish case exemplifies a high level of resistance and limited Europe-
anization in many issue areas (Börzel/Soyaltin 2012; Özel 2013a). 
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The impact of the EU accession process on the Turkish civil society has been studied with a distinct focus 
on the changing role of civil society in different areas (Ergun 2010; Göksel/Güneş 2005; İçduygu 2011; Key-
man/İçduygu 2003; Rumelili 2005; Tocci 2005). The views regarding the EU’s impact are diverse, ranging 
between empowerment, increasing and decreasing capacity, and no impact. Ergun (2010) asserts that the 
EU’s role has been a transformative one regarding the Turkish civil society, and the civil society’s strength-
ening helped spread “the idea of Europe.” According to İçduygu (2011), however, the EU’s impact on civil 
society’s transformation in Turkey has been rather ambivalent. Tocci (2005) suggests that the civil society’s 
transformation cannot be explained by the EU’s impact, but significant domestic dynamics ought to be 
taken into account as well as the overlap between the occurrence of EU-related dynamics and domestic 
ones. Building up on this line of analysis, this working paper takes into consideration complex, juxtaposed 
and - at times - contradictory dynamics along with their varying outcomes. 
2. The EU Accession Process and Differential Impact in Turkey: Failed Dialogue, Em-
powered Organizations 
In the context of EU accession, the European Commission (EC) has been the central agent in promoting 
social dialogue in candidate countries. The EC has undertaken explicit attempts regarding social dialogue, 
which involves the organization and mediation of societal interests in order to incorporate societal inter-
ests (particularly those of employers and workers) into decision-making processes via various channels 
such as “discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint actions.”2 It should be underlined, however, 
despite the emphasis of the EU regarding the role of civil society to take part in the accession process, that 
effective incorporation of civil society in the decision-making or reform-making process has never been 
part of the official policy areas entailed by the acquis. Further, the EU’s civil society policy has been rather 
fragmented, and the policy in candidate and potential candidate countries was formulated as late as in 
2007 with the New Enlargement Strategy 2007-2008 (EC 2007) in line with the Commission’s “Communi-
cation on Civil Society Dialogue” (EC 2005) and the provisions regarding the foundation of an “Instrument 
for Pre-Accession Assistance.” Although the role of civil society in enlargement was largely pronounced in 
the context of the Eastern enlargement, designating a more active role for it in the accession process, it 
was solidified by the “Communication on Civil Society Dialogue.”  
In the case of Turkey, the EC’s attempts in this regard had begun long before the accession negotiations 
were launched, but accelerated since then. In 2011, the EC published “The Guiding Principles for EC Sup-
port of the Development of Civil Society in Turkey” (EC 2011b).  Since the 1990s, the EC has pressured 
Turkey to establish distinct institutions to facilitate social dialogue and build distinct institutions for that 
goal, the most important of those being the Economic and Social Council (ESK). Turkey, indeed, seemed 
like it complied with what was first proposed, then, imposed after the negotiations were launched. The 
ESK was established in 1995 by an executive decree, which later became a law, and was finally incorpo-
rated into the Constitution in 2010, following the successive remarks on its ambiguous legal status by the 
2 European Commission, Employment, Social Affairs & Inclusion, website on “Social Dialogue”, http://ec.europa.eu/
social/main.jsp?catId=329&langId=en, retrieved 24 September 2013. 
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EU (Işığıçok 2002; Sezer 2003). Despite its constitutional status, the ESK has largely failed to function in 
practice, decoupling from what is on paper, as the following sections will shed light upon, exemplifying a 
major limitation with respect to Europeanization (Özel forthcoming).
So far, the EC has applied various mechanisms, including technical and financial support, to attain the 
goals established with regard to supporting civil society in the context of the national program and the Civ-
il Society Facility. Currently, Turkey participates in a number of EU Programmes and Agencies including the 
Seventh Research Framework Programme, Customs 2013, Fiscalis 2013, the European Environment Agen-
cy, the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme, Progress, Culture 2007, Lifelong Learning 
and Youth in Action (EC 2012: 6). Additionally, various programs provided funding and technical and ad-
ministrative support for projects undertaken by civil society organizations. The Civil Society Enhancement 
Program is one of those which financed projects in a broad range from human rights to consumers’ orga-
nizations (EC 2011b). Although Turkey (both the state and the civil society organizations including those 
of business) participates in EU initiatives and programs directed towards civil society’s capacity building, 
the incorporation of civil actors into policy-making as a central objective has not been fulfilled. As the 
most recent Progress Report (EC 2012: 10) underlines, “consultation of civil society remains the exception 
rather than the rule.”
The process of Europeanization regarding social dialogue and interest mediation has operated through 
two major mechanisms in Turkey: First, changes regarding the institutions of consultation and bargaining 
and, second, changes in the status and role of both corporatist and pluralist organizations. This paper sug-
gests that changes through the first mechanism have been much less than those entailed by the second. 
In fact, the changes carried out with respect to the status and the role of organizations spawned a process 
of empowerment of business organizations, corporatist and pluralist alike. The capacity of business orga-
nizations has generally increased, but the outcome has been uneven across organizations mostly brought 
about by the government’s use of its discretion (Özel forthcoming). 
Despite the empowerment of organizations, social dialogue and the institutions which were established 
to facilitate it do not operate effectively. Such failure prevailed in spite of the fact that de jure institutional-
ization was taken to the constitutional level—that the key dialogue forum promoted by the EU was consti-
tutionalized in 2010, following phases of precarious legal status. Thus, Europeanization in this regard has 
been highly limited, as it has been restrained by domestic institutional constraints. The most important 
constraint is the use of executive discretion circumventing not only civil society, but also the legislature. 
An interesting phenomenon is the recent emergence of a coordination platform called “The Coordination 
Council for the Improvement of Investment Environment” (YOİKK) which was institutionalized by the en-
dorsement of the World Bank, not the EU, although the latter `approved` its proceedings later despite the 
fact that this is a bilateral platform, rather than a trilateral one, which is at the core of the social dialogue 
upheld by the EU. 
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2.1 Failed Europeanization in Social Dialogue: the Economic and Social Council in Turkey
Based on its emphasis on civil society’s incorporation into policy and reform-making inspired by the insti-
tutions of social dialogue in several European countries, the EC has promoted and monitored non-state 
actors’ incorporation into policy platforms as well as the establishment of such platforms which would 
effectively facilitate public-private partnership in the context of enlargement. It played an important role 
in the establishment of the ESK, coinciding with the conventions of the International Labor Organization 
(ILO), as well as the demands of business and labor organizations to form a tripartite platform of dialogue 
and consultation. The ESK was founded in 1995 by an executive decree and its composition and functions 
were changed frequently by successive decrees as part of the common practice of post-1980 governance 
in Turkey (Özel 2012). Despite serving as window-dressing vis-a-vis the EU and ILO, the ESK failed to func-
tion effectively because of intensive inter-organizational rivalry over representation, the broad nature of 
its agendas and the overall reluctance of state actors to incorporate societal actors into policy-making. 
Rather than being an arena of dialogue, the ESK has become an arena of conflict. The participating actors 
have used the Council as an arena for expressing their threats to the others. Unions, for instance, boy-
cotted the meetings several times, based on the fear that their own constituencies would oppose their 
“collaboration with the employers and the state” (Sezer 2003: 84). Instead of using the Council as a venue 
of discussion and consensus-making, business and labor acted in similar ways, i.e., several organizations 
boycotted the meetings. Therefore, none of the members, including the government, used the ESK as a 
facilitator for consensus or a consultation platform. The ESK continues to exist without achieving its goals, 
while it only fulfills the de jure conditions imposed by the ILO and EU. When participants of the ESK are 
asked about the reasons behind ESK’s failure, they underline “the lack of a culture of consensus” and “the 
state’s unwillingness to effectively consult with the civil actors”.3 
The ESK has been overtly ’statist’ from the beginning, as bureaucracy and the government were repre-
sented more heavily than civil society actors, thus the number of the ESK’s consultees surpassed that 
of the consulted in most instances. Over-representation of state actors was criticized by business while 
labor claimed and protested that business was over-represented. A similar rivalry prevailed within these 
groups in terms of which specific organization represented business and labor. As a common pattern, each 
government changed the rules, granting and revoking representation to particular civil actors, changing 
the weight of their representation to reward or punish. The increasing concentration of power within the 
state was also reflected in the ESK, since only ministers and undersecretaries attached to ministries were 
gradually provided with seats, while the seats of the public agencies were removed.
Despite that the Council was included in the constitution in 2010 through the referendum on constitution-
al amendments, it has failed to work since it has not convened at all in two years following the referendum, 
exemplifying a high degree of institutional decoupling. Thus, a historic attempt towards an institutional-
ized social dialogue in Turkey failed to meet its initial goals.4 Such failure has been pointed out in succes-
3 Personal interview with a former President of the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİAD), 
Istanbul, September 20, 2012.  
4  All interviewees emphasized the “lack of a culture of consensus” as a factor behind such ineffectiveness of the ESK, 
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sive Progress Reports of the EC, underlining “limited progress in social dialogue” (2011: 78) and suggesting 
that “social dialogue mechanisms were not effectively used during the reporting period. The Economic 
and Social Council, which gained constitutional status following the September 2010 referendum, has not 
yet convened” (EC 2011a: 36).
2.2 Non-EU External Actors and Bilateral Coordination Platforms at Work
Although the EU’s promotion of social dialogue mostly failed in Turkey, some of the bilateral platforms 
between the state and business actors established and sustained by the support of the EU prove to be 
effective. One of the most important institutional changes with respect to public-private dialogue in eco-
nomic governance in Turkey has been the establishment of YOİKK. This coordination platform was initially 
established to improve the investment environment in order to attract more foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which entailed urgency in the context of the 2000-2001 crisis creating a window of opportunity for 
a broad range of institutional changes in Turkey. The main external actor in the launching of this platform 
was not the EU, but the World Bank’s Investment Climate Advisory Service. The EU got onto the board 
later on in the process (and only marginally), indicating the presence of effective institutional change by 
actors apart from the EU, as well as the coinciding foci of international and supranational actors. Similar to 
the developments in Mexico, the effective operation of YOİKK, but not of the ESK, shows the prevalence 
of bilateral forums between the state and business at the cost of excluding labor. 
Based on its structure which has taken on a flexible form regarding the coordination within and between 
public and private actors, it later began to entail a comprehensive list of areas through issue linkages: It 
has helped reduce red tape and implement a reform program to rationalize regulations and policies re-
garding investment, domestic and foreign alike, while facilitating coordination between private and public 
actors, which, in turn, played an important role in fostering economic growth in general and increasing 
FDI volume in particular. Mechanisms of reporting established within YOİKK help maintain the information 
flow between multiple actors, public and private, national and transnational. Institutional innovations 
and relative flexibility to accommodate to the flexible nature of the global economy, particularly with 
respect to its transnational composition incorporating corporate and international organizations, provide 
YOİKK with an unusual character in Turkish economic governance. Despite hosting such innovative aspects, 
YOİKK has also been affected by persistent legacies in Turkey. Having gone through many steps of institu-
tionalization (and de-institutionalization), it has a highly layered structure which hosts overlaps between 
forums, players and mechanisms. Additionally, it does not have a clearly designed structure for monitoring 
and sanctioning. 
The incorporation of business organizations into the YOİKK process, including the Union of Chambers and 
Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB), the Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TÜSİ-
AD), the International Investors Association of Turkey (YASED), and the Turkish Exporters Assembly (TİM), 
has been an important feature of the platform. Some significant laws, such as those on foreign investment 
and simplification of business start-ups were legislated based on the drafts prepared by YOİKK. Hence, 
and some businessmen underlined the state-like character and formation of the ESK.  
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the evolution of YOİKK indicates a significant institutionalization with respect to coordination which could 
not be achieved by the ESK promoted by the EU. This indicates incomplete Europeanization even when 
de jure rules are adopted strictly (at the extent of constitutionalizing in the case of the Turkish ESK). It is 
also a good case to understand the significance of other external actors apart from the EU as sources of 
institutional change. 
2.3 The EU and Partial Empowerment of Corporatist Organizations in Turkey
Contrary to its Mexican counterpart, the Turkish trajectory has entailed the further expansion, reposition-
ing and strengthening of corporatist/semi-public business organizations in the 2000s, a trend which more 
or less provides counter-evidence to the prevalent trend of declining corporatism in the age of market 
transitions, globalization and regionalization. In such context, some corporatist organizations have dis-
played high levels of adaptive capability and the regional integration process has played an important role 
in facilitating that. The EU’s impact in this regard occurred through two mechanisms: The use of direct and 
indirect instruments to enhance the capacity of business organizations, the peak business organization 
and the chambers alike, and the emphasis on civil society’s participation in decision-making in general and 
accession negotiations in particular. 
The most prominent example in this regard is the increasing capacity of TOBB to generate collective ac-
tion in the business community. As the peak corporatist organization of business which had been largely 
politicized and co-opted until the 2000s, TOBB has embarked upon a new role in line with increasing 
transnationalization and globalization, acting as the mediator between the state and businesses as well as 
amongst businesses, and between domestic and foreign capital. TOBB’s vast financial resources contribute 
to its enhanced capacity. Currently, TOBB lends to the state whenever the state needs it; sponsors a broad 
array of public projects; and funds a prominent university and a think-tank. TOBB’s transformation regard-
ing its increasing capacity is reflected in various chambers and unions which have also shown a remarkable 
adaptation capability. 
The capacity of corporatist organizations increased through the undertaking of mutual projects, collab-
oration, technical support, sharing best practices in Europe, matching chambers and provision of proj-
ect-based funding. These organizations’ integration into various transnational networks has also helped 
further this process and it needs to be underlined that these networks are not limited to those in Europe, 
but that they are widespread at the international and regional level. Corporatist organizations have be-
come important protagonists in civil society, turning into watchdogs of the EU harmonization process. 
Established in 2001, the project of the Turkey-EU Chambers Forum launched a broad range of instruments 
and helped found new organizations including companies under the management of TOBB. These com-
panies have sponsored major projects like the renovation of the Customs Offices operating at the borders 
of Turkey. “Matching Chambers” between TOBB and the EU has facilitated the matching of 56 chambers 
of commerce and industry across different provinces in Turkey with those in Europe with similar sectoral 
and technological specialization. Such matching provides intensive collaboration between the chambers, 
facilitates technology transfer and spread norms and procedures. Additionally, the EU-TOBB collaboration 
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initiated Turkey-EU Business Development Centers in several provinces in Turkey, which also entails collab-
oration between Turkish chambers and those in the EU. The EU-Turkey Global Business Bridges Project fa-
cilitates close interaction and collaboration between TOBB and the Association of European Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (Eurochambers). Aiming to expand trade and investment partnerships between 
Turkish and EU-based companies in third countries, the project contributes to the recognition of TOBB as 
a key actor in representing Turkish business not only in Turkey, but also in third countries particularly in 
Turkey’s close vicinity. 
TOBB has embarked on a broad range of new functions in line with those of semi-public business organi-
zations in Europe. One of the projects endorsed by the EU is the initiation of a Vocational Training Project 
(UMEM) and Centers for Vocational Training, which provide training for low-skilled labor force and match 
employers and employees. Other state-like functions included the sponsoring of railway renovation be-
tween Turkey and Pakistan, training programs provided for the chambers in the Middle East, and providing 
hefty incentives for businesses to invest in Palestine (Industry for Peace Program). In a way, by means of 
empowering TOBB, the EU has indirectly contributed to Turkey’s recently acquired role of the ‘big brother’ 
in its close vicinity, especially in the Middle East and Central Asia, an unintended consequence of Turkey’s 
protracted accession process.  
One of the consequences of the EU’s fostering of the increasing capacity of TOBB is the flourishing of small 
and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) in Turkey, the constitutive base of the peak organization. This strikes 
as a contrast to the developments in Mexico where big business’ hegemony has been exacerbated by the 
NAFTA process. TOBB provides credits for the SMEs; helps increase their capacity by training programs, 
matching of employees and the European chambers; facilitates international networks and, thus, exports, 
amongst many other functions. Evidently, the EU’s emphasis on the development of SMEs is not only 
through TOBB, but it entails concrete incentives and mechanisms to enhance the presence and power of 
SMEs in domestic economies as well as in the European economy (Small Business Act for Europe (SBA); 
2008). Some of the principles listed in the SBA are adopted by Turkey’s Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development Organization (KOSGEB) which works in collaboration with several EU-based agencies and 
similar organizations. The Commission’s annual Progress Reports often praise the KOSGEB’s undertakings 
for enhancing the capacity of SMEs (EC 2012: 68).
The development of SMEs in Turkey as well as their expansion to European and global markets appears 
as a noteworthy phenomenon, given the common trend in emerging markets where market liberalization 
usually empowers big business actors at the expense of SMEs. The EU’s contribution to the growth of 
SMEs through promoting distinct incentives, empowering the organizations in which they are represented 
and fostering transnational links has coincided with complex domestic processes where increasing eco-
nomic power of these enterprises has brought about new claims to political power. Such increasing power 
occurred with a twist in Turkey, as it contributed to the coming to power of the socially conservative polit-
ical parties, namely the Welfare Party and the Justice and Development Party (AKP), widely referred to as 
“Islamists.” Some of the recently-flourishing SMEs which shared common religious-cum-cultural identities 
began to generate claims to political power, constituting a major electoral base for the Welfare Party 
in the 1990s and the AKP in the 2000s (Buğra 1997, 1999; Gümüşçü 2010; Hale/Özbudun 2011; Özel 
2010). Initially referred to as “Anatolian Tigers,” this diverse group of businesses significantly expanded 
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particularly outside the Istanbul area and have increasingly integrated into the global economy as contrac-
tors, exporters and, later, investors on international markets and accumulated considerable wealth (Buğra 
1997; Gümüşçü 2010). Some of the newcomers’ credentials embedded in their religiously conservative 
identities (including the links to Islamic orders) contrasted the overtly secular(ist) credentials of most big 
businesses (Özel 2010, 2013b). Hence, the emergence of new rivalries exacerbated the polarization within 
the Turkish business community. 
Many new business organizations have come into existence in Turkey since the early 1990s, paralleling 
the emergence and growth of new business actors bolstered by internationalization and regionalization 
as well as ideological polarization in the Turkish society. On top of all existing cleavages in Turkish business 
such as semi-public vs. pluralist organisations; SMEs vs. big business; export-oriented vs. import-orient-
ed business; Istanbul vs. the rest of Turkey; yet a new cleavage emerged in the 1990s: Islamist (read as 
anti-secular(ist)) vs. secular(ist) business. These newly flourishing actors, with a shared sense of margin-
alization and limited access to state resources and markets in the era of state-led development between 
the 1930s and 1980s, began to mobilize in the early 1990s towards generating collective action. Conse-
quently, the Turkish business community, already multi-layered and fragmented, became increasingly po-
larized between these groups mirroring the polarization in the overall society. The rivalry between the two 
groups has given rise to two simultaneous and seemingly contradictory trends: increasing fragmentation 
on the one hand and unprecedented cohesion on the other hand. Each group has attained considerable 
cohesiveness in the 2000s and the EU accession process played a key role in that. 
2.4 The EU and the Burgeoning - Polarized - Cohesion of Turkish Business 
The partial Europeanization process in Turkey has also empowered pluralist business organizations and 
facilitated the emergence of all-encompassing peak organizations. The Law on Associations enacted in 
2004 in accordance with the EU’s classification on territorial federations exemplifies the most important 
institutional change in this regard.5 The EC endorsed the enactment of this law based on the concern for 
civil society organizations’ active participation in the accession negotiations and harmonization processes.6 
The law facilitated the establishment of federations and confederations. Two important confederations 
were born out of this law: The Turkish Enterprise and Business Confederation (TÜRKONFED) in 2004 and 
the Confederation of Businessmen and Industrialists of Turkey (TUSKON) in 2005, both with claims to 
represent the whole business community in Turkey (Özel 2013b). The nearly simultaneous emergence of 
these new organizations with similar claims for representation signifies the emergence of a ’polar cohe-
sion’ in the Turkish business community, embodying two contradictory processes: unprecedented cohe-
sion on one hand and increasing fragmentation on the other. TÜRKONFED represents secular(ist) business 
interests, while TUSKON represents anti-secular(ist)/Islamist business interests, a microcosm of the cur-
rent polarization in the Turkish society (Özel forthcoming). 
5 Law No: 5253, accepted on 4 November 2004, published in Official Gazette #25649, Vol. 44,  11 November 2004. 
6 TÜRKONFED, website, http://www.TÜRKONFED.org/indexeng.htm, retrieved 1 September 2012.
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Although both confederations claim to become the umbrella pluralist organization (TÜRKONFED with 
10,000 businesspeople, 9 federations and 95 associations; and TUSKON consisting of 45,000 individual 
members, aggregated in 176 affiliated business associations and 7 federations7), their self-acclaimed titles 
are contested because of the ongoing rivalry posed by the other. TÜRKONFED was endorsed by TÜSİAD 
which represents big business, and is often referred to as the `Club of the Rich.` As TÜSİAD sought to es-
chew this image of  a very small constituency which was often pointed out by the EU with regard to the 
need for TÜSİAD’s to expand its space of legitimacy, it fostered the foundation of TÜRKONFED to enhance 
its representative legitimacy particularly vis-à-vis the EU.8 The EU accession process played an important 
role in the establishment of TÜRKONFED, as it was founded in accordance with the EU’s classification on 
territorial federations, based on the aim of monitoring the harmonization processes.9
Despite such claims of TÜSİAD and TÜRKONFED, TUSKON’s overt alliance with the government and limited 
interaction with organizations in the secularist front show the leverage of TUSKON vis-à-vis the govern-
ment in terms of representation, brought about by the ideological affinity between the two. The most 
striking indicator of the overt alliance is the privileged incorporation of TUSKON into several policy plat-
forms, the provision of distinct incentives and/or funding for some of its activities by the government, 
helping the enterprises affiliated with these organizations benefit from access to a broad array of privi-
leges like tenders and contracting. Although the beneficiaries have partially changed, this is in line with 
the legacy of the executive using its discretion to select the businesses to consult with and its creation of 
business allies through clientelistic networks. This exemplifies the pattern of the government facilitating 
capital accumulation by generating its own clientele (Buğra 1994; Özel forthcoming).  
Simultaneously with the impact of Europeanization on business organizations’ changing capacities, organi-
zations have increasingly become integrated into transnational networks. This phenomenon is accelerated 
by the EU accession process. Currently, most chambers, federations and confederations along with all ma-
jor pluralist organizations are members of multiple transnational business networks, some of these based 
in Europe, some others have worldwide and/or regional links. Likewise, the expansion of transnational 
networks has been an increasingly prevalent phenomenon in Mexico. The main difference between the 
two cases is the multi-layered access and activism in those networks undertaken by diverse organizations 
including those representing the interests of SMEs in Turkey, besides the organizations representing big 
interests. 
The peak corporatist organization TOBB in Turkey is a good example of that, as the SMEs make up of its 
overwhelming constituency. It is an active member of Eurochambers as well as of the Business and Indus-
try Advisory Committee (BIAC) of the OECD and takes part in the management of the World Chambers 
Federation and the International Chambers of Commerce, among several others. Pluralist organizations 
have also been transnationalized extensively. The big business’ association TÜSİAD is a member of several 
transnational business networks, such as the Confederation of European Business (BUSINESSEUROPE), 
7 Tuskon, website, http://www.tuskon.org/?p=content&cl=kurumsal&l=kurumsal, retrieved 26 February 2013.
8 TÜRKONFED, website, http://www.TÜRKONFED.org/indexeng.htm, 1 September 2009; personal interview with 
Celal Beysel, chairman of TÜRKONFED, Bursa, 10 September 2009. 
9 TÜRKONFED, website, http://www.TÜRKONFED.org/indexeng.htm, retrieved 1 September 2012.
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the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) and the European Round Table of Industrialists 
(ERT). TUSKON (the peak organization in the anti-secularist pole) has also been increasingly incorporated 
into various transnational networks, some of which are based in Asia and Africa, as part of TUSKON’s des-
ignated prospect for global reach.  Turkish business organizations lobbied in these transnational networks 
for the launching of accession negotiations and proceeding with them.10 
3. NAFTA Accession and Changes in Social Dialogue in Mexico
Unlike the EU accession and membership, NAFTA accession and membership neither entails any specific 
agenda for social dialogue nor for the organization and mediation of societal interests. In the case of 
Mexico, accession to NAFTA indisputably signifies a very limited regional integration process compared 
to what EU accession requires. As a limited regional bloc, yet a new generation free trade agreement, 
the NAFTA involves clauses on intellectual property, investment and, to a certain extent, clauses on labor 
rights and environmental protection in addition to those in the realm of market access, but no clauses on 
social dialogue or interest mediation. Nevertheless, Mexican business’ incorporation into the process of 
negotiations was strongly endorsed by the other NAFTA members, namely the U.S. and Canada. From the 
initiation of negotiations onwards, various civil society organizations have taken part in the debates about 
NAFTA, if not directly in the negotiations process, and this engendered new organizations and alliances to 
monitor the negotiations as well as to assess their outcomes. 
Combined with the nearly simultaneous dynamics in the domestic sphere, the NAFTA process directly and 
indirectly contributed to the reshaping of the organizational landscape regarding business representation 
and interest mediation. Transnational networks of business which NAFTA helped expand and strengthen 
have played important roles in this process of transformation. An important outcome of these intertwined 
dynamics has been the increasing convergence of the interest mediation forms to those prevalent in the 
U.S. and Canada, the two other members of the regional bloc. This is, indeed, fairly striking, when com-
pared to the EU’s failed efforts for convergence of interest mediation in Turkey, despite the fact that de 
jure institutional adaptation was carried out to the highest degree possible. 
3.1 NAFTA, Transnationalization and Mexico’s Decaying Corporatism: A Case for Nafta-iza-
tion or North-Americanization?
In Mexico, interest mediation institutions as well as business organizations have gone through drastic 
changes. Corporatism has been mostly replaced by pluralism, signifying a certain degree of convergence 
towards the Anglo-Saxon interest representation model prevalent in the U.S. and Canada, the other two 
members of NAFTA. The NAFTA agreement helped expand the process of transnationalization of domestic 
businesses in Mexico, contributed to, if not caused, the spread of pluralistic interest mediation, while, in-
directly furthering the dismantling of the previous corporatist mechanisms. In the context of these trans-
formations, most of the former consultative mechanisms collapsed, and pacts and concertations have 
10 Personal interview with a former President of TÜSİAD, Istanbul, 3 July 2008. 
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been mostly replaced by narrow-focused, specialized issue-based lobbying. Although social pacts still exist, 
they either do not function in practice or their design renders them ineffective. The diminishing power of 
all-encompassing organizations (pluralist and corporatist alike) and the rise of pluralistic forms mark the 
new era of interest mediation in Mexico. Increasingly diversified and fragmented business actors endeav-
or to access multiple actors in the increasingly fragmented legislature, unlike in the previous era where 
access was focalized on the executive. 
NAFTA membership has influenced the process of change through various channels despite the fact that 
NAFTA is only a free trade agreement with a certain degree of deepening based on its clauses on invest-
ment, competition and a regulatory framework in certain sectors, among other issue areas. Although 
these channels, particularly the transnational networks, might seem much more indirect compared to 
the EU’s more direct impact regarding changes in civil society organizations and interest mediation, they 
have been substantially influential in the transformation of organizations and interest mediation forms in 
Mexico. Coinciding with NAFTA integration, thus increasing presence and influence of the U.S.-based com-
panies along with transnational networks, new forms of interest mediation have been largely influenced 
by the Anglo-Saxon type of pluralism, signifying a degree of North-Americanization, if not Nafta-ization. 
These changes coincided with the transformations of domestic institutions, contributing to the shaping of 
outcomes. 
One of the most important institutional changes in this regard was the amendment in the Law of Chambers 
in 1996, which became a milestone in declining power of corporatist organizations, as it abolished com-
pulsory membership in the chambers, hence in confederations. This was partially an outcome of intense 
lobbying by powerful pluralist organizations against corporatist forms, particularly contesting compulsory 
membership in chambers and confederations. For decades, leading pluralist business organizations fought 
against corporatism which they perceived as a controlling and co-opting instrument of the authoritarian 
Mexican state.11
Division in the Congress in 1997 constituted another major institutional change which restrained the for-
mer power of the chambers and confederations. Nevertheless, prior to such de jure institutional changes, 
the de facto power of corporatist business organizations like the Confederation of Industrial Chambers 
of the United States of Mexico (CONCAMIN) and the National Chamber of Transformation Industries 
(CANACINTRA) had already started to weaken since the 1980s, although on paper they are still the `public 
organs to be consulted` in the process of policy-making. The domination of pluralist organizations over 
corporatist ones through the course of market transitions, particularly exemplified by the Pact of Econom-
ic Solidarity (PSE) which was launched in the midst of a severe economic crisis in 1987 and the Coordinat-
ing Council for Foreign Trade (COECE) which acted as the advisory body during the NAFTA negotiations, 
representing the business community, had endangered the protagonist presence of chambers and confed-
erations as the exclusive organs of representation and consultation. Amongst these, the PSE carried the 
legacy of pacts in Mexico, despite the fact that it was a different one, as it accentuated the big interests’ 
lead in consultation platforms and mostly co-opted the labor interests, contributing to the emergence of 
“bilateral corporatism” or “business corporatism” (Luna 1992, 2004; Ortega 2003). 
11 Interviews with officials of the Coordinating Council of Businesses (CCE) and the Employers Confederation of the 
Mexican Republic (COPARMEX), 15-17 August 2012, Mexico City.  
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Amongst the pluralist organizations, some of the leading protagonists of the abolition of the Chambers’ 
Law were those hosting businesses with substantial transnational ties, such as the Mexican Business Coun-
cil for International Affairs (CEMAI) and the National Association of Importers and Exporters (ANIERM). 
Endorsed by multinational companies and their transnational networks, these organizations have lobbied 
against corporatism fiercely. The same organizations played a key role in the promotion of a free trade 
agreement with the U.S. and later in the process of NAFTA negotiations. Although most business actors 
had been against such an agreement during most of the 1980s, in the late 1980s, CEMAI and ANIERM, two 
small organizations (particularly compared to the giant confederations hosting thousands of businesses), 
acted as an advocacy group to promote a free trade agreement with the U.S. They lobbied bureaucracy, 
government, academics, and major business organizations and “it was particularly difficult to persuade 
big business.”12 These organizations’ proposals were, initially, opposed by Carlos Salinas, who, in 1990, 
announced his commitment to pursue NAFTA. Between 1990 and 1992, the Ministry of Commerce and 
Industrial Development (SECOFI) organized a series of meetings and workshops to ‘train’ industrialists 
about the advantages of NAFTA as part of the pro-opening campaign. These organizations accompanied 
by SECOFI carefully ’marketed’ NAFTA to the industrialists, by issue linkages underlining that NAFTA would 
increase capital inflows, bring technology, bolster employment, and help further macroeconomic stabili-
zation and growth, all to the industrialists’ benefit.13 
The Mexican Council of International Affairs along with the peak organization, the Coordinating Council 
of Business (CCE), played important roles during the NAFTA negotiations. The CCE initiated the COECE to 
represent the business community in Mexico. The consultation and coordination taking place between 
SECOFI and COECE during the NAFTA negotiations helped consolidate Mexico’s free trade coalition (Ortega 
2003; Thacker 2000). Nevertheless, the whole process was dominated by internationalized big businesses 
with transnational ties. COECE’s general coordinator and some staff members came from CEMAI, which 
played a key role in persuading both the state and business elites, whilst offering its personnel and re-
sources, including its office in Washington D.C., to the use of COECE. 14 Such domination by big interests 
harmed the representative legitimacy of COECE. After the NAFTA negotiations, COECE kept its role as 
representing business actors in free trade negotiations with the EU, but mostly faded away afterwards.
3.2 Transnationalization, NAFTA, Changing Institutions and Organization Landscape in 
Mexico
Following the change of the Law of Chambers in 1996 and then the division in the legislature in 1997, a new 
era in business representation began. Confederations and chambers had lost many members, resources 
and relative power and they had to apply innovative instruments as survival strategies.15 Therefore, the 
dismantling of the corporatist legal framework was accompanied by changing executive-legislature rela-
12 Personal interview with a former chair of CEMAI, Mexico City, 20 May 2004. 
13 Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte, SECOFI, Mexico City, 1992.
14 Personal interview with a former president of CEMAI and coordinator of COECE, Mexico City, 20 May 2004.  
15 As an example of losing members and resources, CANACINTRA had 80,000 members in 1995, but this number 
dropped to 22,000 in 1996. 
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tions, the weakening of the previously omnipotent executive and the empowerment of the latter by the 
emergence of a divided legislature in 1997, increasing the number of veto players within the state. In this 
changing institutional landscape with new incentives, actors became much more diversified: New actors 
were born, whilst the old ones transformed the ways in which they aggregate interests, relate to their 
constituencies as well as act and interact with state actors. In a way, they carved new identities and strate-
gies to access the state and their clients. All business actors, independently of their age or representation, 
shifted their focus from accessing the executive to accessing the legislature, which has been divided since 
1997. The Congress, which had a trivial role before, became a central target to access and influence. 
Semi-public organizations have also gone through a substantial transformation, re-inventing their iden-
tities to adopt more flexible forms to represent business and become service providers, lobbyists, and 
consultancy offices, as “they have become pragmatic in order to survive, and now they play by the rules of 
the new game to regain their power.”16 Organizations like CONCAMIN and CANACINTRA “became ultimate 
lobbyists in the new era, providing precious data to one party, and strategies for the other.”17 They under-
took lobbying at different levels, legislature, judiciary and executive, whilst training their members about 
lobbying, providng data and facilitating access to decision-makers, underlined as “the most important 
assets in the age of information”(Barrios 2004: 11). These strategies helped these organizations to partly 
maintain their membership following the initial drop after the abolition of compulsory membership. 
The partial dismantling of corporatism and newly-flourishing pluralism particularly based on the new 
rules for business organizations and the increasing incorporation of transnational actors transformed the 
ways in which business actors access the state, where lobbying began to substitute former large scale, 
economy-wide concertations. Besides Mexico’s internal dynamics regarding major institutional changes, 
transnational and international actors and dynamics, such as the U.S. and  multi-national corporations 
(MNCs), also played a major role in this process. Hence, some of the key institutional arrangements of 
the “post-revolutionary social pact” have been replaced by new rules, norms, and forms of interaction 
between the state and business. 
A major diversification process has emerged in this context and pluralism has begun to dominate over 
corporatist patterns. As both business and the state have increasingly become fragmented, lobbying firms 
and specialized departments within business organizations (semi-public chambers and confederations, 
and pluralist associations alike) and individual firms become interlocutors for the legislature at both fed-
eral and local levels, for the executive and judiciary as well as the independent agencies in different stages 
of the making of primary and secondary legislation. Some of the new actors in an increasingly pluralist 
setting have joined the older ones in acting like watchdogs in Mexico’s protracted democratic transition. 
Akin to their counterparts in Turkey, such a role has provided them with an enlarged space of legitimacy, 
partially diluting the concerns raised by their serving special - and mostly concentrated - interests. The 
increasing fragmentation of both business and the state have become coupled processes, mirroring one 
another in this context. They have impaired the capacity of the actors to negotiate and coordinate partic-
ularly on broad platforms. 
16 Personal interview with CANACINTRA officials, Mexico City, 4 September 2012. 
17 Personal interview with a lobbying firm, Mexico City, 29 August 2012. 
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A good example of weakening of cross-sectoral broad platforms has been the dismantling of COECE, which 
had facilitated coordination within the private sector and between the private sector and the government 
during the NAFTA negotiations. It mostly faded in the 2000s after `having completed its mission,` since 
the trade negotiations with NAFTA and the EU were already completed. Afterwards, several organizations 
came into existence to take part in international trade-related matters, which mostly represent special 
concentrated interests, domestic and transnational alike. One of these organizations has been the Mex-
ican Business Council for Foreign Trade, Investment and Technology (COMCE), founded by the merger 
of CEMAI and the National Council of Foreign Trade (CONACEX), both representing transnational(ized) 
interests. Working through bilateral business committees and regional delegations, COMCE engages in 
transnational contacts with similar business organizations of different countries. COMCE mostly failed 
to achieve those goals because of the domination of special and extremely concentrated interests which 
“monopolize” the “free-trade” agreements through the organizations and lobbies they lead.18 
The organizational landscape in Mexico has become highly diversified in this new era and this has been 
coupled with the diversification of the ways in which distinct organizations interact with the state, other 
social actors and the public. New actors have emerged and power constellations changed, old actors’ 
behaviors have been transformed, mostly adopting pluralist organizational forms and interest mediation 
patterns prevalent in North America, while leaving corporatist bargaining which was the prevalent form 
before. Lobbying firms, think-tanks and consultancy firms instantaneously evolved into important actors 
on the new scene, situating themselves within the ranks of the flourishing civil society. These new actors 
began to juxtapose and at times replace the once-powerful confederations and/or all-encompassing plu-
ralist organizations which have also taken on new identities through redefinition of their roles and new 
ways of interacting with the state as well as with their members, and transnational links played a major 
role in such transformations. 
4. Conclusion
Market transitions interlinked with regionalization and globalization spawned major changes for all soci-
etal actors and re-shaped state-society relations in upper-middle-income countries. Such transitions have 
been particularly important for domestic business actors who had been previously shielded from the va-
garies of international markets in the context of state-led development and accompanying protectionism. 
As the previously-closed domestic markets were opened up to international competition and incorporated 
into respective regional markets, domestic businesses have searched for new ways to influence policies 
and regulations, access policy-makers, and mediate their interests. Regional blocs have played different 
roles in directly molding or facilitating and furthering these processes, as well as in strengthening or weak-
ening varying business actors.
18 COMCE, website, http://www.comce.org.mx/contenido1.php?id_contenido=1&con=contenidos, retrieved 3 
September 2013.
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This paper examined the differing impact of two similar countries’ integration into two different regional 
blocs regarding social dialogue, along with the changes in organization and mediation of business inter-
ests, focusing on Turkey-EU and Mexico-NAFTA as a paired comparison. Acknowledging the substantial 
differences between these two regionalisms, namely the EU and NAFTA, and hence two different acces-
sion processes, the paper aimed to show the interplay between the process of regionalization and interna-
tional and transnational actors and forces in bringing about significant changes in the respective domestic 
spheres. It demonstrated the limited transformative power of the EU in certain issue areas in the context 
of Turkey’s protracted-cum-stalled accession to the EU, notwithstanding its considerable power in some 
others; and, in the case of Mexico, the unexpected transformative power of NAFTA when combined with 
and intensified by international and transnational forces and processes spawned by NAFTA.  
The paper adds to the growing literature on comparative regionalism, pointing out the variation across 
regionalisms regarding both what they intended to transform and what they ended up transforming. 
Through demarcating distinct (and at times intertwined) influences of multiple actors, apart from the 
EU and the NAFTA, such as international organizations and transnational networks on major changes in 
domestic polities, the paper can be situated in line with several other studies in the respective literature 
which emphasize the existence of multiple sources of domestic change, refuting that regional blocs, par-
ticularly the EU, are the “only games in town,” regarding major domestic changes (Börzel/Risse 2012: 2; 
Schmidt 2002). Accordingly, it investigated the intertwined processes of globalization, transnationaliza-
tion and regionalization, looking into specific actors and forces, along with their transformative effect on 
interest organization and mediation in the respective countries. It showed that international actors and 
transnational networks have become more influential than regional blocs (including the EU) in bringing 
about substantial institutional changes in distinct issue areas.
The paper has shown that concurrent pressures exerted by regionalization, globalization and transnation-
alization have intersected with dynamic changes in the respective domestic arenas in the last decades and 
given rise to varying outcomes. It demonstrated how institutions such as the ESK, promoted by the EU, 
failed to be effective in Turkey, while institutions such as YOİKK, promoted by the World Bank and fostered 
by transnational business links, have proven to be relatively more effective. Such relative effectiveness of 
different sources than Europeanization exemplifies the limited nature of the EU’s transformative power 
together with the significance of other external actors as sources of institutional change in countries like 
Turkey. The paper has shown the widespread presence of decoupling, even when de jure institutionaliza-
tion takes place at the highest extent possible. It also has pointed out the intensification of decoupling in 
line with diminishing credibility of full accession, as in the case of Turkey (Börzel/Soyaltın 2012). Accord-
ingly, it addresses the ongoing discussion on institutional decoupling between formal rule transfer and 
actual implementation particularly regarding institutions requested or recommended by regional blocs 
and international organizations alike. 
The paper demonstrated the complexity of Europeanization across different issues within the same coun-
try by pinpointing the variation in terms of effectiveness of change. The EU’s impact on social dialogue 
and interest organizations in Turkey has varied considerably. The former has been highly limited despite 
the explicit agendas and pressures exerted, while the latter has been substantial, as both semi-public and 
pluralist business organizations have been empowered substantially, accompanied by a burgeoning (po-
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lar) cohesiveness across organizations. Nonetheless, the EU’s promotion of social dialogue largely failed. 
Although the EU has promoted the incorporation of civil society in decision-making in general and the 
accession process in particular, and promoted designated institutions in this regard, it lacked a cohesive 
approach in this context. Combined with the resistance by domestic institutions and actors’ guarding 
those, the councils of social dialogue promoted by the EU failed to function effectively. Whereas, some 
other institutions promoted by non-EU actors have proved to be more effective, signifying the plurality 
of external sources of change regarding institutional arrangements in the upper-middle-income countries. 
Informal ways of mediating interests - both organizational and particularistic - also continue to prevail, as 
part of the long-lasting legacy. In Mexico, however, the NAFTA process has not entailed any agenda on so-
cial dialogue, interest mediation or organizations although it has contributed to major changes regarding 
interest mediation and organizations, combined with domestic institutional dynamics and their changes, 
at times accelerating those. The transnationalization of Mexican big business and the increasing preva-
lence of transnational networks fostered by NAFTA played important roles in this process. 
Despite such constraints regarding Europeanization, the EU’s transformative power has been considerably 
high with respect to the capacity-building and reorganization of business organizations. The enhanced 
capacity of distinct business organizations, in turn, has given rise to relative empowerment. This outcome, 
however, has been accompanied by an unintended consequence, as it helped empowering distinct polit-
ical interests through the links between the incumbent political party and distinct business organizations. 
Brought about by the previous - historical - alliance between the secular(ist) state establishment and big 
businesses, the AKP initially formed alliances with certain groups of SMEs comprised of devout business-
people. Turkey’s protracted accession process to the EU, which nearly stalled by the late 2000s, contrib-
uted to the relative strengthening of SMEs through enhancing the capacity of organizations representing 
SMEs as well as expanding financing instruments. An unintended consequence, the empowerment of 
SMEs has prevailed as they have become a major source of support for the AKP which, by and large, effec-
tively seized newly-arising political claims.  
The very dynamics of Turkey’s and Mexico’s interaction with the respective regional blocs affected the 
direction of these changes, whilst engendering the establishment of a broad array of new institutions and 
organizations along with a high level of institutional decoupling. New forms of state-business interactions 
have emerged out of these trends: Mexican corporatism has more or less dismantled, while a new form of 
corporatism has been on the rise in Turkey, juxtaposed to expanding pluralism. State-business interactions 
now take place at many different layers and in new modalities of governance by the participation of mul-
tifarious actors - national, transnational, regional and supranational alike. PAN and AKP’s coming to power 
in Turkey in 2000 and 2002, respectively, epitomizes a major socio-political turning point in both countries: 
The political movements which had been entrenched against the respective regimes almost concurrently 
came to power, representing socially conservative constituencies who wholeheartedly embraced global-
ization, regionalization and accompanying market transitions.
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